In Malawi, elite politics sustain a maize economy riddled with corruption that traps smallholder farmers in poverty. Shifting more agricultural, social protection, and humanitarian funding towards cash-based support could disrupt this elite bargain, though doing so will require political as well as technical strategy.
Author’s note: This blog is based on the author’s March 2026 brief ‘The Practical Politics of Cash vs. Maize in Malawi’, with the Open Political Economy Analysis Programme at the Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
Malawi has a new government but decades-long problems, now made worse by the collapse in aid. Systemic dysfunction in Malawi’s maize economy keeps smallholder farmers poor and helps elites maintain their grip on power. Increasing the proportion of cash-based support in agriculture, social protection, and emergency aid could be a way to break the cycles of boom, bust, and graft – helping usher in some of the prosperity that has eluded decades of technical intervention. Effecting such a shift will not be easy, but it is possible if key players move beyond the technical and engage with the political.
Malawi is often called a development paradox: power has changed hands peacefully through democratic elections since the early 1990s, yet it remains one of the world’s poorest nations. Over three-quarters of the population live on less than US$3 a day. But why does high poverty persist, despite decades of effort, policy innovation, and international support?
Analysts blame economic crises and pandemics, as well as the droughts, floods, and cyclones that regularly inflict additional hardship. But these factors alone do not explain Malawi’s ‘democracy without development’. To understand what’s going wrong, elite politics – not global phenomena, technical smarts, or capacity building – must be at the centre of discussion.
Malawi’s maize realpolitik
Malawi suffers from an enduring political equilibrium that favours elite interests in government and business above all else. The dominance of the maize economy is a prime example of this in action.
Maize is Malawi’s staple grain, grown by 97% of smallholders. This makes maize a highly political crop. It sits at the heart of many initiatives to tackle long-term poverty and hunger, as well as to improve farm productivity. Maize politics is not the only game in town, but it is a major one. Malawians’ attachment to maize has also become very deep – it’s not only the elites holding onto it.
Political and business elites are adept at taking advantage of these programmes, effectively gaining control over the state’s maize procurement and distribution systems. Government offices show preference for ruling party affiliates when restocking maize supplies. Contracts are inflated to generate funds for ruling parties. Andwell-connected traders receive inside information on timing and prices. In so many ways, elites prioritise their own interests over tackling poverty and hunger, repeatedly.
International donors are aware of these dynamics, but their unwillingness to take a united stand against maize-based corruption also makes them culpable. Government budgets are fungible. Donor funding – for any sector – has enabled the Malawian government to direct a larger share of domestic revenue to maize and help sustain the status quo. Elites’ confidence that international actors will bail Malawi out of the next crisis, as has happened historically, may further embolden them. At the very least, it perpetuates a kind of weary business as usual.
Widespread poverty and hunger are likely to persist as long as maize remains an uncontested, central pillar of government activity. But there are alternatives. More use of cash-based support mechanisms, for example, could fundamentally change the incentive structures of Malawi’s business and political elite. Done right, cash has the potential to help unlock yields that technical interventions have not.
Cash: An alternative with real potential in Malawi
Cash is already a known entity for poverty and humanitarian relief in Malawi. There is a growing stack of evidence – generally, and for Malawi specifically – that cash transfers bring benefits that other interventions do not. Cash transfers are not a silver bullet (nothing is!), but actors must acknowledge that Malawi is stuck in a maize trap. Cash could help get them out of it.
Despite mounting evidence, cash-based programmes receive little attention from politicians and have been perpetually underfunded. Budget allocations to a national anti-poverty initiative, the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP), have repeatedly fallen short of government promises and declined in real terms.
The trickle of government funding for the SCTP contrasts with the raft of benefits it has delivered: less poverty, more children in school, and healthier families. It is cheap and easy to administer, unlike the cumbersome and leaky processes of buying and shipping maize and fertiliser. Cash is delivered straight into mobile money wallets or bank accounts, providing digital transparency that reduces the scope for sticky fingers. And it gives agency to poor and vulnerable households to decide what will help them get a foot on the ladder of opportunity.
In next-door Zambia, cash reforms are on the up. An electronic fertiliser subsidy is redeemable through private-sector outlets. Previously, the government just distributed bags of seed and fertiliser – a one-size-fits-all approach that was ripe for graft. Zambia has also reformed its humanitarian sector. While Malawi responded to a regional drought in 2024 by just handing out more maize, Zambia took a bold step forward: it distributed cash transfers and then offered maize for sale at subsidised prices to cash beneficiaries — effectively creating a market.
Zambia shows how cash can be expanded and extended across sectors. If Malawi’s under-utilised system of cash transfers followed suit, it could help unlock Malawi’s maize logjam.
Propositions for breaking the cycle of corruption in Malawi
Disrupting Malawi’s elite bargain on maize requires strategies that are both technically realistic and politically feasible. These are necessary ingredients for any plan that seeks to effect real change. Here are five propositions for getting there.
Put maize politics at the centre of policy debate. Reforming maize is not primarily a technical issue. All major domestic and international actors are active players in Malawi’s maize realpolitik, and successful reform requires, above all else, understanding the rules of the game. Reformers must openly acknowledge the interests and incentives of all actors, as well as the formal and informal rules guiding their behaviour. A frank, open conversation about those political constraints – and how to negotiate them – is necessary.
Always ask, ‘why not cash?’ Domestic and international players in social protection, agricultural development, food security, and humanitarian aid should always ask, ‘why not cash?’ I don’t say this because I’m a dyed-in-the-wool cash advocate. I’m not, and I don’t suggest that cash transfers alone can deliver transformation. But cash is the main serious alternative to in-kind support, and thus it always merits consideration. A radical and public shift away from maize and towards cash may help catalyse change, notwithstanding the risks.
Make cash politically attractive. Cash transfers will only gain traction in Malawi if they are electorally viable. This is fundamental to winning over the vested interests who might otherwise try to block reforms.
Pursue coordinated policy reform, but expect resistance. Ideally, Malawi should recalibrate its approach to cash and maize through a politically- and technically informed debate. But political opposition might render this impossible. Unquestionably, weakening the stranglehold of the maize economy will require fortitude and political savvy.
Phase out donor funding that reinforces maize dependency. If an electorally viable reform of maize does not emerge, international partners should signal a five-year transition to redirect funding away from maize procurement and distribution and towards cash-based and market-oriented interventions.
End the taboo on thinking politically
In some respects, this analysis is not novel. Its content will be familiar to many Malawians and international observers. What’s new is openly documenting the problems of Malawi’s maize economy, rather than leaving the graft an open secret or burying it in confidential reports for consumption by the privileged few. My recent report, published in collaboration with the Open Political Economy Analysis (Open PEA) Programme at the University of Oxford, attempts to do this.
Breaking the taboo on maize is necessary because economic crises and natural disasters should no longer be used to justify the ongoing misery facing millions of Malawians. Unless the elite bargain on maize is disrupted, widespread hunger and poverty will likely continue. And international actors, well-intentioned or otherwise, are accomplices to that pain if they understand the problem but do not act accordingly. Writing the obvious down in black and white is, in this case, a subversive act – one also done with the best of intentions.
This analysis should be used by both national and international actors. Challenging long-established maize realpolitik needs a bold and sustained strategy, as allowing business – and it is business – to continue as usual simply will not do. Putting analysis into the public domain is a necessary first step to widening the window of possibilities to include approaches that could help break the equilibrium by being technically realistic, politically aware, and politically feasible.
References
Archibald, E, and Open PEA team (2026), "The practical politics of cash versus maize in Malawi," Open PEA Product Series, University of Oxford.