Wilson Prichard
Associate Professor, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy & Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
Wilson Prichard is Associate Professor of Global Affairs and Political Science at the University of Toronto, Chair of the Local Government Revenue Initiative (LoGRI) and Research Fellow at the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). His research focuses on the challenges of building more effective, equitable and accountable tax systems in low-income countries, along with the broad connections between taxation, state building and accountability at both the national and sub-national levels.
He is the author of Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Dynamics of Tax Bargaining (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Taxing Africa (Zed Books, 2018), co-authored with Mick Moore and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, and name a Foreign Affairs best book of 2019, and Innovations in Tax Compliance: Building Trust, Navigating Politics and Tailoring Reform, co-authored with Roel Dom, Anna Custers and Steven Davenport (World Bank, 2022). His research has also been published in, among others, British Journal of Political Science, International Affairs, African Affairs, World Development, The Journal of Development Studies and African Studies Review.
He regularly engages with governments, donors and civil society about the design of tax reform programs, including how to strengthen the links between revenue raising, service delivery and the construction of stronger social contracts. Among others, he has led the design and implementation of innovative and successful property tax reform programs in Sierra Leone, supported reform planning and design in more than a dozen other countries, and was lead advisor to the Innovations and Tax Compliance program at the World Bank.
Recent work by Wilson Prichard
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Can participatory budgeting build government legitimacy and increase tax revenues in weak states?
Evidence from Sierra Leone shows that digital participatory budgeting can increase government legitimacy in weak states but only increases tax compliance for supporters of the incumbent government.
Published 27.06.25