Institutions & Political Economy
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Autocrats in crisis mode: How dictators adapt distributive choices during economic shocks
Autocrats may further discriminate against their opposition as a way to minimise the scope of dissent during economic shocks
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Citizens can effectively monitor the integrity of their elections: Evidence from Colombia
ICT-enabled monitoring tools effectively encourage citizens to oversee their elections and reduce fraud
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Politics at work
Political discrimination in the workplace is large in magnitude, and impacts hiring, pay and promotion
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Improving last-mile service delivery using phone-based monitoring: Evidence from India
Monitoring a programme by calling recipients is a cost-effective way to improve implementation quality
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State-building on the margin: An urban experiment in Medellín
The success of an intervention to increase state presence in gang-controlled neighbourhoods depended on the initial level of gang vs state governance
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Can workfare programmes moderate conflict? Evidence from India
Through providing guaranteed employment for a period, workfare programmes provide insurance against the shocks to income that can lead to conflict
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Alternative dispute resolution in Liberia
Alternative dispute resolution reduced the number of prolonged and unresolved disputes, and meant that disputes were less likely to turn violent
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Jam-barrel politics: Road construction and legislative behaviour in Colombia
The Colombian government used roads as a token of exchange for legislative support, sparking debates about the proper handling of public resources
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Building trust in state institutions: Evidence from Pakistan
Providing information about reforms in local courts increases trust in state institutions and decreases use of non-state dispute resolution mechanisms