Institutions & Political Economy
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Fiscal rules, public overspending, and political accountability in Colombia
Limitations to fiscal spending reduced overspending in public administration without affecting public goods, aligning with voters’ preferences
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Autocratic rule and social capital: Evidence from Imperial China
The impact of persecutions in 17th and 18th century China can still be seen today in the form of less political participation and community engagement
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How democracy causes growth: Evidence from Indonesia
Democratically elected leaders are less likely to impose socially inefficient regulations or engage in rent-seeking and, hence, enhance firm...
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Increasing civilian cooperation in security operations: Evidence from Afghanistan
Exposure to radio messages on the dangers of roadside bombs increases locals’ cooperation with military forces to reduce security threats
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Electing educated leaders during democratisation: Evidence from Indonesia
The economic success of democratisation crucially depends on the education level of the newly elected local leaders
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Caste, identity, and worker productivity in India
While caste-based occupations may hold 'productivity benefits', removing the discriminatory links between low castes and work brings even...
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Do voters hold politicians accountable for vote-buying?
When voters receive payments, politicians are given greater leniency, and in turn steal more
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Political alignment and fiscal outcomes in local government: Evidence from Ghana
If local governments are too dependent on the central government, they are less likely to be able to meet the needs of the locals
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How can culture affect household behaviour?
Family decisions and outcomes are affected by and also change with cultural institutions