Institutions & Political EconomyPage 4 out of 17
Subjective evaluation and bureaucratic performance: Experimental evidence from China
Uncertainty in the identity of an evaluator discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and significantly improves state employees’...
Fiscal rules, public overspending, and political accountability in Colombia
Limitations to fiscal spending reduced overspending in public administration without affecting public goods, aligning with voters’ preferences
Autocratic rule and social capital: Evidence from Imperial China
The impact of persecutions in 17th and 18th century China can still be seen today in the form of less political participation and community engagement
How democracy causes growth: Evidence from Indonesia
Democratically elected leaders are less likely to impose socially inefficient regulations or engage in rent-seeking and, hence, enhance firm...
Increasing civilian cooperation in security operations: Evidence from Afghanistan
Exposure to radio messages on the dangers of roadside bombs increases locals’ cooperation with military forces to reduce security threats
Electing educated leaders during democratisation: Evidence from Indonesia
The economic success of democratisation crucially depends on the education level of the newly elected local leaders
Caste, identity, and worker productivity in India
While caste-based occupations may hold 'productivity benefits', removing the discriminatory links between low castes and work brings even...
Do voters hold politicians accountable for vote-buying?
When voters receive payments, politicians are given greater leniency, and in turn steal more
Political alignment and fiscal outcomes in local government: Evidence from Ghana
If local governments are too dependent on the central government, they are less likely to be able to meet the needs of the locals