Organised Crime

We conclude by bringing together the main lessons, the policy guidance, and the research priorities that follow from the evidence we have reviewed. Across contexts as diverse as Italy, El Salvador, Colombia, and the eastern Congo, we have seen that what matters most is not simply a state presence but a state that effectively protects property, resolves disputes, and enforces contracts. When governments build schools or roads yet leave policing and justice weak, criminal groups step in to fill that vacuum and extract rents. Where kingpin arrests fragment those groups, violence rises, yet where governments target the most violent actors and back enforcement with credible social support, violence falls, and legal economic activity expands. The evidence suggests that economic incentives can drive recruitment: adolescents weigh the wages, status, and perceived safety offered by criminal organisations against the legal opportunities available to them. Improvements in safety, formal employment, social insurance, or conditional transfers can shift that cost-benefit calculus toward lawful activity. At the same time, criminal governance imposes broader societal costs – mobility restrictions, extortion, and electoral interference – that often persist even after overt violence declines.

These broad costs suggest that prevention strategies must go hand in hand with the strengthening of legal institutions and effective law enforcement. Police reform should advance in lockstep with professionalised prosecution services and more efficient judicial systems. Procedural deadlines, merit-based recruitment, and evidence-driven case management can increase the likelihood of conviction, thereby raising the expected cost of engaging in criminal activity. Labour policy also belongs at the centre of organised crime control. Facilitating dynamic labour markets can increase the opportunity cost of working in organised crime. For instance, evidence from Brazil shows that unemployment benefits can fully offset the crime surge that follows mass layoffs. At the same time, the evidence suggests that targeted income support and vocational training in the neighbourhoods most exposed to recruitment could strengthen that effect.

We see the highest returns when the state moves early, before young people decide to – or are forced to – join a criminal career. Causal evidence from Peru and El Salvador shows that interventions targeting the critical ages of gang recruitment can disrupt the cycle of criminal involvement and affect the operations of gangs by increasing their cost of labour. At the same time, surveys of adolescent boys in schools in Medellín show that roughly one in six expects to join a gang by age 25 because he underestimates legal earnings and overrates the status gangs confer. Low-cost information campaigns and career-guidance modules embedded in middle school curricula could correct those beliefs and shift stated intentions away from crime. When early interventions fail and youth end up incarcerated, governments must treat prisons as hubs of desistance, not schools of crimes or criminal hubs. Cognitive-behavioural therapy combined with market-relevant training and strong social support cuts recidivism among high-risk inmates, but only if prison managers exercise significant supervision and keep senior leaders from directing violence on the outside.

Criminal taxation merits the same attention as criminal violence. Extortion acts as a regressive tax on micro-firms and poor households. Interventions that make extortion more visible to enforcement – such as reducing cash handling – or efforts to make extortion more costly – such as adaptations of focused deterrence – could reduce the incidence of criminal taxation. Community cohesion amplifies these formal strategies. Where traditional institutions in Mexico or strong neighbourhood associations in El Salvador already resolve disputes, gangs struggle to recruit and to tax. Municipal grants that fund local dispute boards and public spaces can foster that resilience. Important gaps remain. We still know little about interventions that shift adolescent expectations and behaviour at scale. Ongoing work should test the impact of peer mentoring, efforts to strengthen cooperative norms within schools, early deterrence interventions, labour-market simulations, and school-based vocational tracks. These interventions should measure not only their effects on recruitment but also their influence on norms, perceived earnings, social status, and risk tolerance. Mental-health burdens of criminal exposure also need rigorous study; embedding trauma modules in household surveys and randomising therapy through schools or clinics would reveal both prevalence and cost-effectiveness.

Intergenerational effects represent another blind spot. Administrative data that follows children of gang-affected households into adulthood would clarify whether criminal shocks propagate disadvantage. We must also learn how peer norms evolve and how to address them at the right ages to achieve sustained protective environments. Also, scholars should put a focus on courts to understand which legal reforms raise conviction certainty without eroding due process. Furthermore, researchers ought to measure the outcomes that residents experience – mobility, extortion payments, recruitment, perceptions of authority – rather than rely solely on homicide counts. Primary data collection, or alternative measures such as night-time lights and cell-phone mobility data offer objective proxies that complement administrative records. Moreover, structural models calibrated with experimental data can simulate equilibrium trade-offs: when one policy reduces violence, does extortion increase allowing criminal organisations to grow stronger? When recruitment falls, do gang wages rise, tempting other youth to join? Such models can inform balanced policy mixes.

Additionally, existing research has paid limited attention to how gender influences organised crime dynamics. It influences who is recruited, the roles individuals occupy, their exposure to violence, and how communities experience the broader effects of criminal activity. Addressing these gendered patterns is essential for developing more effective and inclusive interventions. Finally, it is important to highlight the lack of research on organised crime in West Africa, where qualitative reports suggest that criminal organisations are an increasingly pressing concern. Future work should aim to better understand the dynamics of organised crime in this context, including its drivers, forms of governance, and socioeconomic impacts.

Our review leaves us both cautious and optimistic. Organised crime blocks investment, skews labour markets, and weakens democracy. Yet, research suggests that governments can mitigate these harms when they combine credible enforcement, opportunity expansion, and justice reform. The task now is to heed the minds of adolescents at the threshold of recruitment, to ease the psychological wounds violence leaves behind, and to trace the long shadow that criminal rule casts across generations. With rigorous scholarship tied to policy experimentation, we can design interventions that not only lower today’s violence but also broaden tomorrow’s economic and civic opportunities.

References

Abril, V, E Norza, S M Perez-Vincent, S Tobón, and M Weintraub (2024), “Building trust in the police: Evidence from a multi-site experiment in Colombia,” Working paper.

Abt, T (2019), Bleeding out: The devastating consequences of urban violence – and a bold new plan for peace in the streets, Basic Books.

Accardo, P, G De Feo, and G De Luca (2023), “With a little help from my friends: Political competition in the shadow of organized crime,” Journal of Public Economics, 227: 104998.

Acemoglu, D (2005), “Politics and economics in weak and strong states,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7): 1199–1226.

Acemoglu, D, G De Feo, and G D De Luca (2020), “Weak states: Causes and consequences of the Sicilian mafia,” The Review of Economic Studies, 87(2): 537–581.

Acemoglu, D, J A Robinson, and R J Santos (2013), “The monopoly of violence: Evidence from Colombia,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(suppl 1): 5–44.

Ajzenman, N (2021), “The power of example: Corruption spurs corruption,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 13(2): 230–257.

Ajzenman, N, S Galiani, and E Seira (2015), “On the distributive costs of drug-related homicides,” The Journal of Law and Economics, 58(4): 779–803.

Alarcón Barrera, H S, and M M Sviatschi (2025), “Reclutamiento de niños y adolescentes por el crimen organizado: Revisión de literatura,” Manuscrito de revisión de literatura.

Albanese, J S (2022), “Why corruption is the largest problem in the world: Freda Adler Distinguished International Scholar Award address,” International Criminology, 2(2): 103–110.

Albanese, J S (2025), “Corruption as the cause, not the effect, of organized crime? A review and assessment of cases across the world,” Journal of Economic Criminology, 100137.

Aldeco, L, A Jurado, and A A Ramírez-Álvarez (2024), “Internal migration and drug violence in Mexico,” Journal of Development Economics, 171: 103334.

Alesina, A, S Piccolo, and P Pinotti (2019), “Organized crime, violence, and politics,” The Review of Economic Studies, 86(2): 457–499.

Ambrosius, C, and D A Leblang (2025), “A deportation boomerang? Evidence from US removals to Latin America and the Caribbean,” Demography, 62(2): 419–439.

Arellano-Bover, J, M De Simoni, L Guiso, R Macchiavello, D J Marchetti, and M Prem (2024), “Mafias and firms,” Unpublished manuscript.

Arias, E D (2006), “The dynamics of criminal governance: Networks and social order in Rio de Janeiro,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 38(2): 293–325.

Arias, E D, and N Barnes (2017), “Crime and plural orders in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” Current Sociology, 65(3): 448–465.

Arjona, A (2016), Rebelocracy, Cambridge University Press.

Atuesta, L H, and A F Ponce (2017), “Meet the narco: Increased competition among criminal organisations and the explosion of violence in Mexico,” Global Crime, 18(4): 375–402.

Avis, E, C Ferraz, and F Finan (2018), “Do government audits reduce corruption? Estimating the impacts of exposing corrupt politicians,” Journal of Political Economy, 126(5): 1912–1964.

Baires, W, J Vargas, and M Sviatschi (2025), “Should I stay or should I go? The unintended effects of enfranchisement,” Working paper.

Balletta, L, A M Lavezzi, et al. (2019), “The economics of extortion: Theory and evidence on the Sicilian mafia,” Discussion Papers Department of Economics and Management, Università di Pisa(242).

Bandiera, O, L I D Diaz, J M Jimenez, S V Rozo, and M M Sviatschi (2022), “Rebel governance and development: The persistent effects of guerrillas in El Salvador,” NBER Technical Report.

Bandiera, O (2003), “Land reform, the market for protection, and the origins of the Sicilian mafia: Theory and evidence,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19(1): 218–244.

Baraldi, A L, E Papagni, and M Stimolo (2024), “Neutralizing the tentacles of organized crime: Assessment of the impact of an anti-crime measure on mafia violence in Italy,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 223: 57–85.

Barbarino, A, and G Mastrobuoni (2014), “The incapacitation effect of incarceration: Evidence from several Italian collective pardons,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1): 1–37.

Barnes, N (2025), Inside criminalized governance: How and why gangs rule the streets of Rio de Janeiro, Cambridge University Press.

Barone, G, and G Narciso (2015), “Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go?” Journal of Urban Economics, 86: 98–110.

Barrios-Fernández, A, and J García-Hombrados (2025), “Recidivism and neighborhood institutions: Evidence from the rise of the evangelical church in Chile,” Journal of Labor Economics, 43(3): 000–000.

Becker, G S (1968), “Crime and punishment: An economic approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 76(2): 169–217.

Becker, G S, and Y Rubinstein (2011), “Fear and the response to terrorism: An economic analysis,” Unpublished manuscript.

Becker, G S, and G J Stigler (1974), “Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1): 1–18.

Bernal, C, M Prem, J F Vargas, and M Ortiz (2024), “Peaceful entry: Entrepreneurship dynamics during Colombia’s peace agreement,” Journal of Development Economics, 166: 103119.

Berrebi, C, and E F Klor (2008), “Are voters sensitive to terrorism? Direct evidence from the Israeli electorate,” American Political Science Review, 102(3): 279–301.

Besley, T, and T Persson (2009), “The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics,” American Economic Review, 99(4): 1218–1244.

Besley, T, and T Persson (2010), “State capacity, conflict, and development,” Econometrica, 78(1): 1–34.

Bhatt, M P, S B Heller, M Kapustin, M Bertrand, and C Blattman (2024), “Predicting and preventing gun violence: An experimental evaluation of READI Chicago,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 139(1): 1–56.

Biderman, C, J M De Mello, R S De Lima, and A Schneider (2019), “Pax monopolista and crime: The case of the emergence of the Primeiro Comando da Capital in São Paulo,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 35(3): 573–605.

Blair, G, J M Weinstein, F Christia, E Arias, E Badran, R A Blair, et al. (2021), “Community policing does not build citizen trust in police or reduce crime in the global south,” Science, 374(6571): eabd3446.

Blair, R A, and M Weintraub (2023), “Little evidence that military policing reduces crime or improves human security,” Nature Human Behaviour, 7(6): 861–873.

Blanco, L (2012), “The impact of insecurity on democracy and trust in institutions in Mexico,” RAND Corporation Technical Report.

Blanco, L, and I Ruiz (2013), “The impact of crime and insecurity on trust in democracy and institutions,” American Economic Review, 103(3): 284–288.

Blattman, C (2023), Why we fight: The roots of war and the paths to peace, Penguin.

Blattman, C (2025), “Criminal malpractice: Why cities can’t copy their way to security,” SocArXiv, v2, doi: 10.31235/osf.io/ghcpj.

Blattman, C, and J Annan (2010), “The consequences of child soldiering,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4): 882–898.

Blattman, C, S Chaskel, J C Jamison, and M Sheridan (2023), “Cognitive behavioral therapy reduces crime and violence over ten years: Experimental evidence,” American Economic Review: Insights, 5(4): 527–545.

Blattman, C, G Duncan, B Lessing, and S Tobón (2025), “Gang rule: Understanding and countering criminal governance,” Review of Economic Studies, 92(3): 1497–1531.

Blattman, C, G Duncan, B Lessing, and S Tobón (in press), “State-building in the city: An experiment in civilian alternatives to policing,” American Political Science Review.

Blattman, C, D P Green, D Ortega, and S Tobón (2021), “Place-based interventions at scale: The direct and spillover effects of policing and city services on crime,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(4): 2022–2051.

Blattman, C, J C Jamison, and M Sheridan (2017), “Reducing crime and violence: Experimental evidence from cognitive behavioral therapy in Liberia,” American Economic Review, 107(4): 1165–1206.

Blattman, C, B Lessing, and S Tobón (2022), “The terrible trade-off: Why governments must choose between more violence or stronger gangs,” Modern War Institute, 22 July, retrieved from https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-terrible-trade-off-why-governments-must-choose-between-more-violence-or-stronger-gangs/.

Blattman, C, A Rodriguez-Uribe, and S Tobón (2024), “Who expects to join criminal gangs and why? Occupational choice among 5,000 teenage boys in Medellín,” Working paper.

Blattman, C, A Rodríguez-Uribe, and S Tobón (2025), “Breaking bad, early: Which adolescents join drug-selling gangs and why?” Working paper.

Blok, A (1974), The mafia of a Sicilian village, 1860–1960: A study of violent peasant entrepreneurs, Waveland Press.

Bobonis, G J, L R Cámara Fuertes, and R Schwabe (2016), “Monitoring corruptible politicians,” American Economic Review, 106(8): 2371–2405.

Braga, A A, D Weisburd, and B Turchan (2019), “Focused deterrence strategies effects on crime: A systematic review,” Campbell Systematic Reviews, 15(3): e1051.

Britto, D G, P Pinotti, and B Sampaio (2022), “The effect of job loss and unemployment insurance on crime in Brazil,” Econometrica, 90(4): 1393–1423.

Brown, R, V Montalva, D Thomas, and A Velásquez (2019), “Impact of violent crime on risk aversion: Evidence from the Mexican drug war,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 101(5): 892–904.

Brown, R, and A Velásquez (2017), “The effect of violent crime on the human capital accumulation of young adults,” Journal of Development Economics, 127: 1–12.

Brown, Z Y, E Montero, C Schmidt-Padilla, and M M Sviatschi (2025), “Market structure and extortion: Evidence from 50,000 extortion payments,” Review of Economic Studies, 92(3): 1595–1624.

Bruhn, J, et al. (2021), “Competition in the black market: Estimating the causal effect of gangs in Chicago,” Unpublished manuscript.

Bueno de Mesquita, E (2020), “Territorial conflict over endogenous rents,” The Journal of Politics, 82(1): 162–181.

Buonanno, P, R Durante, G Prarolo, and P Vanin (2015), “Poor institutions, rich mines: Resource curse in the origins of the Sicilian mafia,” The Economic Journal, 125(586): F175–F202.

Buonanno, P, I Ferrari, and A Saia (2024), “All is not lost: Organized crime and social capital formation,” Journal of Public Economics, 240: 105257.

Buonanno, P, G Prarolo, and P Vanin (2016), “Organized crime and electoral outcomes: Evidence from Sicily at the turn of the XXI century,” European Journal of Political Economy, 41: 61–74.

Buscaglia, E, and J Van Dijk (2005), “Controlling organized crimes and corruption in the public sector,” Unpublished manuscript.

Butts, J A, C G Roman, L Bostwick, and J R Porter (2015), “Cure violence: A public health model to reduce gun violence,” Annual Review of Public Health, 36(1): 39–53.

Cabra-Ruiz, N, S Rozo, and M M Sviatschi (2024), “Forced displacement, the perpetuation of autocratic leaders, and development in origin countries,” NBER Working Paper w33131.

Calderón, G, G Robles, A Díaz-Cayeros, and B Magaloni (2015), “The beheading of criminal organizations and the dynamics of violence in Mexico,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(8): 1455–1485.

Campedelli, G M, G Daniele, A F Martinangeli, and P Pinotti (2023), “Organized crime, violence and support for the state,” Journal of Public Economics, 228: 105029.

Carvalho, L S, and R R Soares (2016), “Living on the edge: Youth entry, career and exit in drug-selling gangs,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 121: 77–98.

Castillo, J C, and D Kronick (2020), “The logic of violence in drug war,” American Political Science Review, 114(3): 874–887.

Castillo, J C, D Mejía, and P Restrepo (2020), “Scarcity without Leviathan: The violent effects of cocaine supply shortages in the Mexican drug war,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 102(2): 269–286.

Castro, E, F Coy, C Schmidt-Padilla, and M M Sviatschi (2025), “Breaking the gang: A preventive approach to reduce recruitment in schools,” Working paper, Johns Hopkins University; UC Berkeley; Princeton University & NBER.

Cavgias, A, R Bruce, and L Meloni (2023), “Policy enforcement in the presence of organized crime: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro,” Journal of Development Economics, 162: 103071.

Chioda, L, J M De Mello, and R R Soares (2016), “Spillovers from conditional cash transfer programs: Bolsa Família and crime in urban Brazil,” Economics of Education Review, 54: 306–320.

Chioda, L, B Feigenberg, M Holmlund, M G Martinez, and G Montenegro (2024), “Honduras Safer Municipalities Project: Impact evaluation of the temporary jobs program for at-risk youth,” World Bank Report.

Collazos, D, E García, D Mejía, D Ortega, and S Tobón (2021), “Hot spots policing in a high-crime environment: An experimental evaluation in Medellín,” Journal of Experimental Criminology, 17(3): 473–506.

Corbacho, A, J Philipp, and M Ruiz-Vega (2015), “Crime and erosion of trust: Evidence for Latin America,” World Development, 70: 400–415.

Córdova, A (2019), “Living in gang-controlled neighborhoods: Impacts on electoral and nonelectoral participation in El Salvador,” Latin American Research Review, 54(1): 201–221.

Cornaglia, F, N E Feldman, and A Leigh (2014), “Crime and mental well-being,” Journal of Human Resources, 49(1): 110–140.

Cruz, J M (2010), “Central American maras: From youth street gangs to transnational protection rackets,” Global Crime, 11(4): 379–398.

Cruz, J M (2013), “Beyond social remittances: Migration and transnational gangs in Central America,” in How migrants impact their homelands, 213–233.

Dahlström, C, V Lapuente, and J Teorell (2012), “The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bureaucracy, and the institutional deterrents of corruption,” Political Research Quarterly, 65(3): 656–668.

Dal Bó, E, P Dal Bó, and R Di Tella (2006), “‘Plata o plomo?’: Bribe and punishment in a theory of political influence,” American Political Science Review, 100(1): 41–53.

Daniele, G, and G Dipoppa (2017), “Mafia, elections and violence against politicians,” Journal of Public Economics, 154: 10–33.

Daniele, G, and B Geys (2015), “Organised crime, institutions and political quality: Empirical evidence from Italian municipalities,” The Economic Journal, 125(586): F233–F255.

Daniele, V, and U Marani (2011), “Organized crime, the quality of local institutions and FDI in Italy: A panel data analysis,” European Journal of Political Economy, 27(1): 132–142.

Davis, J M, and S B Heller (2020), “Rethinking the benefits of youth employment programs: The heterogeneous effects of summer jobs,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 102(4): 664–677.

Dell, M (2015), “Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war,” American Economic Review, 105(6): 1738–1779.

Dell, M, B Feigenberg, and K Teshima (2019), “The violent consequences of trade-induced worker displacement in Mexico,” American Economic Review: Insights, 1(1): 43–58.

Dinarte-Diaz, L, and P Egana-delSol (2024), “Preventing violence in the most violent contexts: Behavioral and neurophysiological evidence from El Salvador,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 22(3): 1367–1406.

Dipoppa, G (2025), “How criminal organizations expand to strong states: Local agreements and migrant exploitation in northern Italy,” The Journal of Politics, 87(2): 556–571.

Dube, O, O García-Ponce, and K Thom (2016), “From maize to haze: Agricultural shocks and the growth of the Mexican drug sector,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(5): 1181–1224.

Durlauf, S N, and D S Nagin (2011), “Imprisonment and crime: Can both be reduced?” Criminology & Public Policy, 10(1): 13–54.

Dustmann, C, and F Fasani (2016), “The effect of local area crime on mental health,” The Economic Journal, 126(593): 978–1017.

El País (2023), “El tren de Aragua, la megabanda criminal venezolana que siembra el terror de Chile a Colombia,” retrieved from https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-06-29/el-tren-de-aragua-la-megabanda-criminal-venezolana-que-siembra-el-terror-de-chile-a-colombia.html (accessed 17 July 2025).

Elliott, K A (1997), “Corruption as an international policy,” in Corruption and the global economy.

Escobar, M A, S Tobón, and M Vanegas-Arias (2023), “Production and persistence of criminal skills: Evidence from a high-crime context,” Journal of Development Economics, 160: 102969.

Estefan, A, and R Ordonez (2024), “The effects of extortion on entrepreneurial entry and exit: Theory and evidence from Guatemala,” available at SSRN 5015513.

Fearon, J D, and D D Laitin (2003), “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war,” American Political Science Review, 97(1): 75–90.

Fenizia, A, and R Saggio (2024), “Organized crime and economic growth: Evidence from municipalities infiltrated by the mafia,” American Economic Review, 114(7): 2171–2200.

Fergusson, L, C A Molina, and J A Robinson (2022), “The weak state trap,” Economica, 89(354): 293–331.

Ferraz, C, and F Finan (2008), “Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2): 703–745.

Ferraz, C, and F Finan (2011), “Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audits of local governments,” American Economic Review, 101(4): 1274–1311.

Finckenauer, J O (2005), “Problems of definition: What is organized crime?” Trends in Organized Crime, 8(3): 63–83.

Frye, T, and E Zhuravskaya (2000), “Rackets, regulation, and the rule of law,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 16(2): 478–502.

Gallego, J (2018), “Civil conflict and voting behavior: Evidence from Colombia,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35(6): 601–621.

Gamba, A, G Immordino, and S Piccolo (2018), “Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law,” Journal of Public Economics, 159: 79–88.

Gambetta, D (1996), The Sicilian mafia: The business of private protection, Harvard University Press.

Ganau, R, and A Rodríguez-Pose (2018), “Industrial clusters, organized crime, and productivity growth in Italian SMEs,” Journal of Regional Science, 58(2): 363–385.

Gehring, K, S Langlotz, and S Kienberger (2023), “Stimulant or depressant? Resource-related income shocks and conflict,” Review of Economics and Statistics: 1–47.

GI-TOC (2023), Global organized crime index – 2023, Geneva, Switzerland, retrieved from https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/global-organized-crime-index-2023/ (accessed 24 July 2025).

Guerrero, N P, and M M Sviatschi (2025), “Mass migration and the expansion of criminal networks,” Working paper, retrieved from https://scholar.princeton.edu/sviatschi/publications.

Guerrero-Trinidad, N (2025), “Grassroot institutions, prosocial and moral norms,” Job market paper.

Gutierrez, I A, H R Nopo, O Molina, and M M Sviatschi (2024), “Can attitudinal changes towards reporting curb violence? An experimental school intervention in Peru,” NBER Working Paper No. 33203.

Hamermesh, D S (1999), “Crime and the timing of work,” Journal of Urban Economics, 45(2): 311–330.

Heller, S B, A K Shah, J Guryan, J Ludwig, S Mullainathan, and H A Pollack (2017), “Thinking, fast and slow? Some field experiments to reduce crime and dropout in Chicago,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(1): 1–54.

Hobsbawm, E J (1969), Bandits, Pantheon Books.

Infobae (2025), “Alarmante cifra de la PNP: 8 de cada 9 detenidos por sicariato son menores de edad,” retrieved from https://www.infobae.com/peru/2025/06/19/alarmante-cifra-de-la-pnp-8-de-cada-9-detenidos-por-sicariato-son-menores-de-edad/ (accessed 19 June 2025).

Ingram, M C, and M M Da Costa (2014), “Targeting violence reduction in Brazil: Policy implications from a spatial analysis of homicide,” Policy Brief, Brookings Institution.

InSight Crime (2010), “How ‘Mano Dura’ is strengthening gangs,” retrieved from https://insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs/ (accessed 24 July 2025).

Insight Crime (2023), Tren de Aragua: De megabanda carcelaria a empresa criminal transnacional, retrieved from https://insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Tren-de-Aragua-De-megabanda-carcelaria-a-empresa-criminal-transnacional-InSight-Crime-Oct-2023-4.pdf (accessed 17 July 2025).

InSight Crime (2025), “Insight Crime’s 2024 homicide round-up,” retrieved from https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/insight-crime-2024-homicide-round-up/ (accessed 19 June 2025).

International Crisis Group (2017), Mafia of the poor: Gang violence and extortion in Central America, Latin America Report No. 62, Brussels, retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/62-mafia-poor-gang-violence-and-extortion-central-america (accessed 17 July 2025).

Janke, K, C Propper, and M A Shields (2016), “Assaults, murders and walkers: The impact of violent crime on physical activity,” Journal of Health Economics, 47: 34–49.

Jaramillo, D (2024), “The spillover effects of prisoners releases: Evidence from Ecuador,” Job market paper.

Kalsi, P (2018), “The impact of US deportation of criminals on gang development and education in El Salvador,” Journal of Development Economics, 135: 433–448.

Kalyvas, S N (2006), The logic of violence in civil war, Cambridge University Press.

Kasfir, N (2015), “Rebel governance – constructing a field of inquiry: Definitions, scope, patterns, order, causes,” Rebel Governance in Civil War, 2: 21–46.

Katz, C M, E C Hedberg, and L E Amaya (2016), “Gang truce for violence prevention, El Salvador,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 94(9): 660.

Kennedy, D M (2011), Don’t shoot: One man, a street fellowship, and the end of violence in inner-city America, Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Khanna, G, C Medina, A Nyshadham, J Tamayo, and N Torres (2023), “Formal employment and organised crime: Regression discontinuity evidence from Colombia,” The Economic Journal, 133(654): 2427–2448.

Knight, B, and A Tribin (2023), “Immigration and violent crime: Evidence from the Colombia–Venezuela border,” Journal of Development Economics, 162: 103039.

Koivu, K L (2018), “Illicit partners and political development: How organized crime made the state,” Studies in Comparative International Development, 53(1): 47–66.

Konrad, K I, and S Skaperdas (1998), “Extortion,” Economica, 65(260): 461–477.

Koppensteiner, M F, and L Menezes (2021), “Violence and human capital investments,” Journal of Labor Economics, 39(3): 787–823.

Le Moglie, M, and G Sorrenti (2022), “Revealing ‘mafia inc.’? Financial crisis, organized crime, and the birth of new enterprises,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 104(1): 142–156.

Lessing, B (2017a), “Counterproductive punishment: How prison gangs undermine state authority,” Rationality and Society, 29(3): 257–297.

Lessing, B (2017b), Making peace in drug wars: Crackdowns and cartels in Latin America, Cambridge University Press.

Lessing, B (2021), “Conceptualizing criminal governance,” Perspectives on Politics, 19(3): 854–873.

Lessing, B, and G Denyer Willis (2019), “Legitimacy in criminal governance: Managing a drug empire from behind bars,” American Political Science Review, 113(2): 584–606.

Levin, B (2013), “American gangsters: RICO, criminal syndicates, and conspiracy law as market control,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 48: 105.

Lindo, J M, and M Padilla-Romo (2018), “Kingpin approaches to fighting crime and community violence: Evidence from Mexico’s drug war,” Journal of Health Economics, 58: 253–268.

Londoño Mesa, A, L Marín Llanes, and M A Vélez Lesmes (2024), “Resumen de la evaluación institucional, de resultados y de impacto del PNIS: Recomendaciones para un nuevo programa de transformación territorial en zonas cocaleras,” Universidad de los Andes Policy Report.

Lorenc, T, S Clayton, D Neary, M Whitehead, M Petticrew, H Thomson, et al. (2012), “Crime, fear of crime, environment, and mental health and wellbeing: Mapping review of theories and causal pathways,” Health & Place, 18(4): 757–765.

Lorenc, T, M Petticrew, M Whitehead, D Neary, S Clayton, K Wright, et al. (2014), “Crime, fear of crime and mental health: Synthesis of theory and systematic reviews of interventions and qualitative evidence,” Public Health Research, 2(2): 1–398.

Machado, D B, L C Rodrigues, D Rasella, M Lima Barreto, and R Araya (2018), “Conditional cash transfer programme: Impact on homicide rates and hospitalisations from violence in Brazil,” PloS One, 13(12): e0208925.

Magaloni, B, E Franco-Vivanco, and V Melo (2020), “Killing in the slums: Social order, criminal governance, and police violence in Rio de Janeiro,” American Political Science Review, 114(2): 552–572.

Magaloni, B, K Gosztonyi, and S Thompson (2021), “State-evading solutions to violence: Organized crime and governance in indigenous Mexico,” unpublished manuscript.

Magaloni, B, G Robles, A M Matanock, A Díaz-Cayeros, and V Romero (2020), “Living in fear: The dynamics of extortion in Mexico’s drug war,” Comparative Political Studies, 53(7): 1124–1174.

Mallon, M R, and S Fainshmidt (2022), “Who’s hiding in the shadows? Organized crime and informal entrepreneurship in 39 economies,” Journal of Management, 48(1): 211–237.

Martínez, O, E Lemus, C Martínez, and D Sontag (2016), “Killers on a shoestring: Inside the gangs of El Salvador,” International New York Times, NA–NA.

Mejía, D, and P Restrepo (2013), “Bushes and bullets: Illegal cocaine markets and violence in Colombia,” Documento CEDE (2013-53).

Melnikov, N, C Schmidt-Padilla, and M M Sviatschi (2025), “When crackdowns unlock mobility: Gangs and development,” Working paper (en preparación).

Melnikov, N, C Schmidt-Padilla, and M M Sviatschi (in press), “Gangs, labor mobility, and development,” Econometrica.

Michaelsen, M M, and P Salardi (2020), “Violence, psychological stress and educational performance during the ‘war on drugs’ in Mexico,” Journal of Development Economics, 143: 102387.

Millán-Quijano, J (2020), “Internal cocaine trafficking and armed violence in Colombia,” Economic Inquiry, 58(2): 624–641.

Mirenda, L, S Mocetti, and L Rizzica (2022), “The economic effects of mafia: Firm level evidence,” American Economic Review, 112(8): 2748–2773.

Monteiro, J, and R Rocha (2017), “Drug battles and school achievement: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro’s favelas,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 99(2): 213–228.

Moodie, E (2010), Nations of emigrants: Shifting boundaries of citizenship in El Salvador and the United States, JSTOR.

Murphy, T E, and M A Rossi (2020), “Following the poppy trail: Origins and consequences of Mexican drug cartels,” Journal of Development Economics, 143: 102433.

Osorio, J (2015), “The contagion of drug violence: Spatiotemporal dynamics of the Mexican war on drugs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(8): 1403–1432.

Osorio, J, L I Schubiger, and M Weintraub (2018), “Disappearing dissent? Repression and state consolidation in Mexico,” Journal of Peace Research, 55(2): 252–266.

Owens, E G, D Weisburd, K L Amendola, and G P Alpert (2018), “Can you build a better cop? Experimental evidence on supervision, training, and policing in the community,” Criminology & Public Policy, 17(1): 41–87.

Pecanha, V, J Guerra, R Rocha, C Millett, and T Hone (2024), “The effects of urban violence on primary health care services: Evidence from poor neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro,” Working paper.

Pereira, L, R Pucci, and R R Soares (2025), “Air interdiction, drug-trafficking displacement, and violence in the Brazilian Amazon,” unpublished manuscript.

Perilla, S, M Prem, M E Purroy, and J F Vargas (2024), “How peace saves lives: Evidence from Colombia,” World Development, 176: 106529.

Phillips, B J (2015), “How does leadership decapitation affect violence? The case of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico,” The Journal of Politics, 77(2): 324–336.

Pi, J, and P Zhang (2020), “Organized crime and wage inequality,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 67(3): 344–361.

Piemontese, L (2023), “Uncovering illegal and underground economies: The case of mafia extortion racketeering,” Journal of Public Economics, 227: 104997.

Pinotti, P (2015), “The economic costs of organised crime: Evidence from southern Italy,” The Economic Journal, 125(586): F203–F232.

Ponce, C, M B de Sanfeliú, M R Chávez, and M Shi (2016), “Extorsiones a la micro y pequeña empresa de El Salvador,” FUSADES, Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social.

Prem, M, A Rivera, D Romero, and J F Vargas (2021), “Selective civilian targeting: The unintended consequences of partial peace,” available at SSRN 3203065.

Prem, M, J F Vargas, and D Mejía (2023), “The rise and persistence of illegal crops: Evidence from a naive policy announcement,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 105(2): 344–358.

Reynolds, L, and M McKee (2010), “Organised crime and the efforts to combat it: A concern for public health,” Globalization and Health, 6(1): 21.

Ríos, V (2013), “Why did Mexico become so violent? A self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by competition and enforcement,” Trends in Organized Crime, 16(2): 138–155.

Rodgers, D (2006), “The state as a gang: Conceptualizing the governmentality of violence in contemporary Nicaragua,” Critique of Anthropology, 26(3): 315–330.

Rolla, P, and P Justino (2022), “The social consequences of organized crime in Italy,” WIDER Working Paper No. 2022/106.

Rozo, S V (2018), “Is murder bad for business? Evidence from Colombia,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 100(5): 769–782.

Rozo, S V, T Anders, and S Raphael (2021), “Deportation, crime, and victimization,” Journal of Population Economics, 34(1): 141–166.

Sánchez De La Sierra, R (2020), “On the origins of the state: Stationary bandits and taxation in eastern Congo,” Journal of Political Economy, 128(1): 000–000.

Schargrodsky, E, and S Tobón (2025), “From schools of crime to criminal hubs? Prisons and organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Working paper.

Singer, A J, C Chouhy, P S Lehmann, J N Walzak, M Gertz, and S Biglin (2019), “Victimization, fear of crime, and trust in criminal justice institutions: A cross-national analysis,” Crime & Delinquency, 65(6): 822–844.

Skarbek, D (2011), “Governance and prison gangs,” American Political Science Review, 105(4): 702–716.

Skarbek, D (2012), “Prison gangs, norms, and organizations,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 82(1): 96–109.

Skarbek, D (2024), “The political economy of criminal governance,” Public Choice, 200(1): 1–24.

Slutzky, P, and S Zeume (2018), “Organized crime and firms: Evidence from Italy,” SSRN Electronic Journal.

Sobrino, F (2019), “Mexican cartel wars: Fighting for the US opioid market,” available at: https://www.fersobrino.com/files/DraftPaper.pdf.

Sviatschi, M M (2022a), “Making a narco: Childhood exposure to illegal labor markets and criminal life paths,” Econometrica, 90(4): 1835–1878.

Sviatschi, M M (2022b), “Spreading gangs: Exporting US criminal capital to El Salvador,” American Economic Review, 112(6): 1985–2024.

Tilly, C (2017), “War making and state making as organized crime,” in Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and Social Change, Routledge, pp. 121–139.

Tobón, S (2022), “Do better prisons reduce recidivism? Evidence from a prison construction program,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 104(6): 1256–1272.

Ungar, M (2011), Policing democracy: Overcoming obstacles to citizen security in Latin America, Johns Hopkins University Press.

UNICEF (2024), “Ecuador: Homicide rate among children and adolescents soars 640 percent in four years,” press release, retrieved from https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/ecuador-homicide-rate-children-adolescents (accedido el 19 de junio de 2025).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2023), “Global study on homicide 2023,” Vienna, Austria, retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-homicide.html.

UNODC (2013), “Transnational organized crime in West Africa: A threat assessment,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Regional Office for West and Central Africa, retrieved from https://www.unodc.org (accessed 25 July 2025).

Velásquez, A (2020), “The economic burden of crime: Evidence from Mexico,” Journal of Human Resources, 55(4): 1287–1318.

Venkatesh, S A, and S D Levitt (2000), “Are we a family or a business? History and disjuncture in the urban American street gang,” Theory and Society, 29(4): 427–462.

Villarreal, A, and W-H Yu (2017), “Crime, fear, and mental health in Mexico,” Criminology, 55(4): 779–805.

Yashar, D J (2018), Homicidal ecologies: Illicit economies and complicit states in Latin America, Cambridge University Press.