The cross-border effects of environmental regulation: Evidence from battery recycling in the US and Mexico
Tightened US regulations around lead increased exports of lead-acid batteries to Mexico for recycling, worsening health outcomes for locals, especially the poor
Combined approaches to agricultural productivity: Evidence from Ethiopia
Building roads and extending agriculture services to rural Ethiopian communities had no impact alone, but increased agricultural productivity together
The political economy of policy learning: Evidence from China
While China’s bureaucracy and institutions allow large-scale policy experimentation, incentives in complex political environments can inhibit policy learning
Collective reputation in trade: Evidence from the Chinese dairy industry
A quality scandal that affected some Chinese dairy firms disrupted exports from all firms across the industry
Fighting malnutrition with cash and information: Evidence from Nepal
Mothers who received modest cash inputs along with information on practices to reduce malnutrition were more likely to adopt those practices
The economic effects of easing zoning restrictions: Evidence from São Paulo
Zoning reform in São Paulo led to new building permits, modest price declines primarily benefitting the college-educated rich moving in from suburbs
Leveraging political incentives for environmental regulation: Evidence from China
Leveraging high-powered political incentives for pollution control could distort the decentralised enforcement of environmental regulation
Food versus vouchers: Evidence from Indonesia
Providing vouchers for rice and eggs allowed for better targeting, increased protein consumption, and was cheaper to administer than in-kind benefits
Urban water disinfection and mortality decline: Evidence from Mexico
Ageing pipe systems and the absence of complementary sanitation investments compromise the health benefits of water disinfection
Non-monetary teacher incentives and student learning in Guinea
Public recognition rewards for well-performing public-sector teachers are less effective than in-kind rewards at improving student learning