Public Economics
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Incentivising bureaucrats through performance-based postings: Experimental evidence from Pakistan
How can we best incentivise bureaucrats in a formal manner that avoids concerns over corruption?
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Autonomy – not rules – may be a government’s best weapon in the fight against corruption
Giving government procurement officers more leeway in decision-making over expenses could save billions
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Cash transfers and the wider economy: Evidence from Kenya
Do unconditional cash transfers increase welfare in communities as a whole, even within households that do not receive them?
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How tax audits can open credit floodgates: Evidence from Ecuador
Ecuador's efforts to increase corporate tax audits led to a welcome surprise: banks stepped up their lending efforts as confidence in firms rose
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International tax avoidance and development
Corporate taxation is at the heart of economic development, and cardiac failure looms if international tax reform is not made globally inclusive
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Balancing corruption and exclusion: Incorporating India’s Aadhaar into public food distribution
Fighting corruption with India's new national ID system has cost some low-income households their benefits in the process
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The impact of social incentives on tax payment in Pakistan
An evaluation of two programmes reveals that public disclosure of tax information and social recognition of top taxpayers increases tax revenues
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Taxation, civic culture and state capacity
Why do some countries have high rates of taxation and high compliance, while some failed states have neither?
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Bureaucrats in Russia: The cost of inefficiency
How does the productivity of individual bureaucrats affect the overall efficiency of the public sector?